The Antiquities Act, National Monuments, and the Regional Economy by Jakus, Paul M & Akhundjanov, Sherzod B.
The Antiquities Act, National Monuments, and
the Regional Economy
Paul M. Jakus and Sherzod B. Akhundjanov∗
Abstract
Large, landscape-scale national monuments have long been controversial. It has
been claimed that large monuments harm local economies by restricting growth
of the grazing, timber, mining, and energy industries. Others have asserted that
large monuments aid economic growth by reducing reliance on volatile commodity
markets and fostering tourism growth. In this study, we use a synthetic control ap-
proach to measure the average causal effect of nine national monument designations
on county-level per capita income. We find no evidence that monument designation
affected per capita income in any of 20 counties hosting nine large (>50,000 acres)
national monuments established under the Antiquities Act (six monuments) or by
legislative action (three monuments). The broad economic claims of both advocates
and critics of large national monuments have little empirical support. The absence
of a designation effect for large national monuments is likely due to the attributes
of federal land and the legal constraints under which it is managed.
Keywords: Antiquities Act; National Monuments; Regional per capita income; Syn-
thetic control.
JEL: R11; Q58; O13.
1 Introduction
Between 1996 and 2016, Presidents Clinton and Obama used the Antiquities Act to es-
tablish 22 landscape-scale National Monuments (NMs) on more than 11.5 million acres
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of federally-owned land. Located primarily in western states, landscape-scale NMs are
defined as roughly greater than 100,000 acres. The Presidential proclamation for each
new monument unequivocally stated that it would be “subject to existing valid uses”
of federal land and, as such, was crafted to minimize disruption to ongoing economic
activities that remain compatible with protection of the historic and scientific objects
contained within the monument. However, numerous industry groups and elected offi-
cials often denounced a new monument as imposing regional economic hardship. Large
national monuments are alleged to curtail grazing, mining, logging, and energy activities,
thus diminishing economic development alternatives or even causing regional economic
ruin. In contrast, others claim these same national monuments will support a growing
tourism sector, accelerate economic growth, and free local economies from dependency
on volatile commodities markets. Clearly, both claims cannot hold true for the same
national monument.
Despite two decades of heated political rhetoric about the broader economic effects
of large national monuments, a survey of the peer-reviewed literature yields only one
study that has studied the aggregate economic effects of such monuments. Jakus and
Akhundjanov (2018) recently found that the time paths of per capita income in the
two counties that host the Grand Staircase-Escalante NM—established in 1996—had not
changed as the result of monument designation. The authors concluded that any economic
harm to one set of industries caused by monument designation had been offset by growth
in another industry group. No other study has isolated the aggregate economic effect of
large national monuments. Instead, most studies have lumped national monuments into a
protected land category that includes national parks, wilderness areas, national recreation
areas and other land classifications (Lewis et al., 2003; Rasker et al., 2013). However,
visitation at national parks has long been supported by public and private promotional
campaigns and is known to be a strong regional economic driver (Wilkerson, 2003; Gabe,
2016). One cannot conclude that national monuments—whose management is not driven
by tourism—will provide a positive aggregate economic effect similar to national parks.
National monuments can be very large relative to national parks: for example, in 2017
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each of Utah’s two largest monuments was larger than the combined acreage of the state’s
five national parks. The local footprint of a large national monument, with its relative
lack of tourism and attendant restrictions on land use and access, means a monument
could have, as many have asserted, a negative effect on local economic well-being.1
The results presented by Jakus and Akhundjanov (2018) do not support such an argu-
ment, but their research was limited to only Grand Staircase-Escalante NM, which might
raise concerns about external validity. The present study examines whether their result
is more general by rigorously establishing the direction and magnitude of the average
causal effect of similarly large monuments established between 1982 and 2001. Six of
our study monuments were established by Antiquities Act proclamations, whereas the
remaining three were created by legislative acts of Congress. All of our study monuments
have been in place for more than a decade and any positive or negative effect on the
regional economy should be measurable today. We begin by presenting a brief history
of the controversial Antiquities Act, as well as its use in recent decades. After an expla-
nation of our statistical approach, we report the effect of large national monuments on
county-level per capita income. We detect no statistically significant effect of monument
designation on the time path of per capita income in any of the 20 counties studied. We
discuss the nature of federal land and its management, and physical and legal constraints
to explain the absence of a designation effect.
2 The Antiquities Act and National Monuments
The Antiquities Act of 1906 is historically rooted in the land disposal policies of the
United States. Laws of the day did little to prevent rampant, and often illegal, exploita-
tion of timber and minerals, construction of railroads on, or other commercialization of,
public lands, or the looting of archaeological artifacts (Rothman, 1989, pp.64-67). By
the late-19th century, destruction of historic and pre-historic artifacts at Chaco Canyon
1In December 2017 President Trump shrank the collective size of Utah’s Bears Ears NM and Grand
Staircase-Escalante NM by 2.0 million acres. Although his proclamations did not specifically cite negative
economic effects as a rationale for the reduction, President Trump publicly stated that these monuments
had “...threatened your local economies...” (Davidson and Burr, 2017).
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(New Mexico), Mesa Verde (Colorado), and other sites had generated great concern.
Throughout the west some land claims were made not to establish a homestead but in-
stead to excavate artifacts and profit by selling them to museums and private collectors.
In response to the destruction of sites rich in heritage, scientists, historians and others
pressed for federal protections that would allow for careful and orderly excavation and
assessment of archaeological sites (Lee, 2006, pp.22-27). Their efforts over more than two
decades culminated in the Antiquities Act, which allows the President to withdraw fed-
eral land from disposal and place such land in a National Monument to protect resources
of historic, pre-historic, and scientific interest. Congress also has the right to establish a
NM legislatively.
Unless otherwise designated by Congress, from 1933 until 1996 all national mon-
uments were managed by the National Park Service (NPS) according to its preserva-
tion/recreation policies (Rothman, 1989, pp.202-203). The NPS assessed the tourism
potential of its national monuments; those deemed to have outstanding scenery had their
tourism infrastructure improved. Many of these monuments, such as Grand Canyon,
Mount Olympus (Olympic) and Mukuntuweap (Zion), were subsequently reclassified by
Congress as National Parks (Rothman, 1989, pp.70-71). However, the broader group of
monuments devoid of such scenery did not receive similar treatment. This policy allowed
national parks to establish a distinct and well-defined brand amongst the general public.
In contrast, national monuments have never benefited from a clearly delineated identity
and are often viewed by the public as ‘less than’ national parks.
The 1976 Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) explicitly stated the
government’s intention to retain ownership of lands to which it held title. The unambigu-
ous implication of the new policy was that public lands had value beyond that associated
with its disposal; FLPMA thus gave the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an agency
long-associated with management of grazing and mining activities on public lands, a
mandate to manage its lands with regard to environmental values (Daly and Middaugh,
2006). Subsequently, in 1996, President Clinton designated almost 2 million acres of
BLM land in southern Utah as the Grand-Staircase-Escalante National Monument, with
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its management to follow landscape-scale planning principles developed by then Interior
Secretary Bruce Babbitt (Ranchod, 2001).
In contrast with NMs previously established under the Antiquities Act, landscape-
scale monuments were to remain the responsibility of the federal agency managing the
land at the time of designation. Second, landscape-scale management required the respon-
sible agency to honor “existing valid rights”, i.e., to allow active grazing and extractive
operations to continue so long as these activities do not threaten the historic and sci-
entific objects protected by the monument. Third, any government-run visitor services
were to be located in communities adjacent to the NM (not within NM boundaries) so
that local communities would directly benefit from monument designation and manage-
ment, while development of recreational amenities within monument boundaries were to
be limited. Since 1996, the numerous landscape-scale national monuments designated
under the Antiquities Act have followed these management guidelines.
3 The Economic Effect of Land Protection Changes
Public lands can serve as both a source of employment and as a non-market amenity.
Roback (1982) is credited with the seminal study of how wages in urban areas respond
to changes in non-market amenities, initiating a stream of research that remains active
to this day (see, for example, Albouy, 2016). Numerous authors (see, for instance, Deller
et al., 2001 and Kim et al., 2005) have extended this work to rural regions, noting that
land protections such as those conferred by national monument status can lead imme-
diately to restrictions on land use, especially in the agricultural, timber, mining, and
energy industries, plus support industries (e.g., road or pipeline construction). This loss
in a region’s economic base may be offset by other gains accruing in the region. For
example, a growing tourism industry offers employment alternatives to those who may
have lost jobs in industries constrained by public land use restrictions. Second, although
restriction-related employment losses may lead to out-migration, protected lands may
induce amenity-based in-migration, by attracting those seeking to establish businesses
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associated with the protected land (creating new jobs) and/or retirees who bring non-
wage income.
Relative to large national monuments, the only land protection changes of similar scale
have occurred in the nation’s forested lands. In 1994, the Pacific Northwest Forest Plan
(NWFP) removed 11 million acres from timber production in three states, significantly
reducing employment in the timber industry. Chen and Weber (2011) found increased
population growth in communities located within 10 miles of a forest managed under the
NWFP, but no measurable change in community wealth. Eichman et al. (2010) found
reduced employment in counties affected by the NWFP, and employment losses were
not offset by in-migration. Pugliese et al. (2015) examined the effects of reduced timber
harvest on county level population and employment in 12 western states. Similar to the
Lewis et al. (2003) study of northern forests, Pugliese et al. (2015) found no relationship
between the percentage change in timber sales volumes and overall employment growth.
Finally, Chen et al. (2016) used a community level analysis to find that communities
located within 5 miles of a NWFP forest had greater income and population growth, as
well as greater property values, relative to matched control communities.
These empirical studies demonstrate that evidence of the net effect of geographically
extensive land protections is rather mixed. The bulk of the literature has focused on
population and employment, which would seem to obscure other effects of land restrictions
on economic well-being. For example, in 2017 wages for production and nonsupervisory
employees in the mining and logging sector ($27.50 per hour) were more than twice
the hourly rate ($13.34 per hour) received by production workers in the leisure and
hospitality sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017a). These wage rates imply that
a loss of 25 jobs in the mining and logging industry would require an additional 52
jobs in the leisure and hospitality sector to keep wage income constant. If land use
restrictions result in a tradeoff between these two sectors, a region could see increasing
employment accompanied by a falling average wage. Thus, employment growth alone is
not fully indicative of regional economic well-being.2 Per capita income is an alternative
2See Mehl (2017) for trend analysis of important economic indicators—population, employment, and
income—after the monument designations. This study, however, does not disentangle the causal effect
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measure of economic well-being that captures wage income, non-wage income and transfer
payments. As such, this measure succinctly captures the structural effects of the changing
mix of employment opportunities, the wages available, and net migration in response to
monument designation.3
4 Estimating a Designation Effect
Measuring the treatment effect of an intervention—in our case, monument designation—
on a local economy requires a set of control economies that serve as a basis of comparison.
Traditional econometric methods, such as difference-in-differences, rely upon the analyst’s
judgment as to which units are valid comparisons and which are not. Moreover, all con-
trol units are given an equal weight in the analysis and are assumed to closely match
the treatment unit in all or most of its attributes in the pre-treatment period. Within
the context of our study, local income, population or employment could be driven by
unit-level attributes, such as population density, employment growth, sex ratio, racial
mix, educational attainment, etc., and we would want to choose control units that closely
match the treatment unit in the most important attributes during the pre-designation pe-
riod. It is unlikely that any given comparison unit will closely approximate the treatment
unit in all, or even many, important attributes. Further, applying one’s best professional
judgment to selection of control units is a rather arbitrary process; a different set of
comparison units would result in a different treatment effect. We avoid these limitations
by implementing the synthetic control method, which accounts for unit attributes and
removes the analyst from the selection process by relying upon a data-driven procedure
to select suitable comparison units (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010,
2015). We briefly describe the intuition behind the method within the context of our
application, followed by methodological details.
A synthetic control is a weighted average of selected control units (called donor units),
where the weights are determined based on how closely the characteristics of the control
of NMs from widespread trends in growth.
3Per capita income does not measure wealth effects that may be associated with amenity-migration,
such as changing property values.
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unit match those of the treatment unit during the pre-treatment period. As a result,
such a synthetically composed unit can approximate the treatment unit (in the pre-
intervention period) better than any single control unit because it is a weighted combina-
tion of available control units, each of which may closely capture one or more attributes
of the treatment unit.
Methodologically, synthetic control can be thought of as a two-step procedure. The
first step focuses on the pre-treatment time frame; in our case, this is the time period
preceding designation of a national monument. Characteristics for both treatment and
control units are used to estimate two sets of weights: (i) covariate weights, which are
assigned to unit characteristics based on their predictive power on the outcome of inter-
est, and, (ii) unit weights, which are assigned to control units based on their similarity
(in terms of measurable characteristics) to the treatment unit. Donor units that closely
match the treatment unit on the outcome of interest and important attributes in the pre-
intervention period are considered close comparisons and will receive a large unit weight
whereas units that do not match up well receive a weight near or equal to zero. Unit
weights are then used to construct a synthetic control unit; a good synthetic control will
track the pre-designation path of a treatment unit’s outcome measure closely. The second
step directly answers the question, “What would have happened to the outcome of inter-
est had the intervention not occurred?” by using the post-intervention outcomes of the
synthetic control unit to recover counterfactual outcomes. Assuming all other exogenous
post-treatment events affect the synthetic control and the treatment unit equally (e.g.,
recessions), the difference between the predicted outcome for the synthetic control and
the actual outcome of the treatment unit during the post-treatment period measures the
treatment effect.
Consider N + 1 units, for i = 1, . . . , N + 1, that are observed for T time periods, for
t = 1, . . . , T . Assume that only the first unit, i = 1, is exposed to the event of interest
(monument designation), while the remaining N units serve as potential controls. Treat-
ment can affect one or more units so the methods presented here are applied separately to
each unit. Suppose the intervention occurs at time period T0 + 1, so that 1, 2, . . . , T0 are
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the pre-intervention periods and T0 + 1, T0 + 2, . . . , T are the post-intervention periods,
where 1 ≤ T0 < T . Let Y NIit denote the outcome of interest for unit i in period t if unit
i is not exposed to the intervention up to time t, for i = 1, . . . , N + 1 and t = 1, . . . , T .
Let Y Iit denote the outcome of interest for unit i in period t if unit i is exposed to the
intervention in periods T0 +1 to T . Hence, for the pre-intervention periods, the outcomes
satisfy Y Iit = Y
NI
it , for all i = 1, . . . , N + 1 and t = 1, . . . , T .
Let αit = Y
I
it − Y NIit represent the intervention or treatment effect for unit i in period
t. Since only the first unit is affected by the intervention, subscript i in the treatment
effect can be replaced with one. Our interest is in estimating the effect of the treatment
on the outcome for the treated unit in the post-intervention period
α1t = Y
I
1t − Y NI1t for t > T0 (1)
Equation (1) is ill-posed in that, while Y I1t is observed, the counterfactual outcome, Y
NI
1t ,
is unobservable for t > T0. The goal of the synthetic control method is to replace the
missing Y NI1t with a synthetic counterfactual outcome.
Ideally, a synthetic control should closely approximate the exposed unit in all rele-
vant quantifiable characteristics in the pre-intervention period. We formalize this idea
by defining Zi as a r × 1 vector of observed explanatory variables of the outcome vari-
able. Moreover, suppose Y¯ Ki =
∑T0
t=1 ktYit is a linear combination of pre-intervention
outcomes for unit i, where K = (k1, . . . , kT0)
′ is the set of weights, of which there are M
of them, K1, . . . ,KM .
4 These M linear combinations of outcomes can be used to control
for the effect of unobservable common confounders that vary with time (Abadie et al.,
2010). Therefore, the synthetic control method improves on traditional fixed effects or
difference-in-differences methods, which can control only for time-invariant unobservable
confounders.
4Abadie et al. (2010) suggest two approaches for selecting M sets of weights, for M ≤ T0. In the
first approach, one sets M = T0 and obtains the values of the outcome variables for unit i for the
pre-intervention period. In particular, Y¯ K1i , Y¯
K2
i , . . . , Y¯
KM
i is Y¯
K1
i = Yi1, Y¯
K2
i = Yi2, . . . , Y¯
KT0
i = YiT0 .
In the second approach, one sets M = 1 and obtains a single linear combination of pre-intervention
outcomes: the average of the outcome variable for T0 pre-intervention periods. Specifically, Y¯
K1
i =
1
T0
∑T0
t=1 Yit. Given that the first approach places a more rigorous requirement for a control unit to
receive a nonzero weight, we adopt that approach in our empirical analysis.
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Let W = (w2, . . . , wN+1)
′ be N ×1 vector of weights, with wi ≥ 0 for i = 2, . . . , N + 1
and w2 + · · · + wN+1 = 1, that are assigned to unexposed units in the pre-intervention
period to obtain a synthetic control. Notice that different values of the W-vector yield
potentially different weighted averages of control units, and thus potentially different
synthetic controls. The optimal weights W∗ = (w∗2, . . . , w
∗
N+1)
′ must thus satisfy
N+1∑
i=2
w∗i Y¯
K1
i = Y¯
K1
1 , . . . ,
N+1∑
i=2
w∗i Y¯
KM
i = Y¯
KM
1 (2)
N+1∑
i=2
w∗iZi = Z1 (3)
In words, W∗ produces a weighted average of the available control units such that it
closely mimics the exposed unit (in terms of outcome and predictor values) during the pre-
intervention periods. In practical applications, there usually exists no set of weights for
which (2) and (3) hold exactly. Hence, the weights are chosen such that these conditions
hold approximately.
Abadie et al. (2010) propose to select the vector W∗ = W(V) that minimizes the
overall discrepancy in characteristics of the exposed and synthetic control units, measured
by
||X1 −X0W|| =
√
(X1 −X0W)′V(X1 −X0W) (4)
where X1 = (Z
′
1, Y¯
K1
1 , . . . , Y¯
KM
1 )
′ is a k × 1 (k = r + M) vector of pre-intervention
characteristics of the exposed unit; X0 is a k×N matrix of pre-intervention characteristics
of the control units, with the jth column of (Z′j, Y¯
K1
j , . . . , Y¯
KM
j )
′; and V is some k × k
symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix that assigns weights to the variables in X1 and
X0 depending on their predictive power on the outcome. We use a numerical search over
matrices W and V such that the mean squared prediction error outlined in equation (4)
is minimized for the pre-intervention periods.
The synthetic control unit obtained from the optimal weights W∗ = (w∗2, . . . , w
∗
N+1)
′
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can then substitute Y NI1t in equation (1) to produce the estimator of the treatment effect
αˆ1t = Y
I
1t −
N+1∑
i=2
w∗i Y
NI
it for t > T0 (5)
The statistical inference cannot be based solely on the magnitude of the measured
treatment effect. With the synthetic control, the treatment effect is not amenable to a
standard parametric tests of statistical significance.5 Instead, one conducts a series of fal-
sification or “refutability” tests by assigning the treatment to each donor unit (equivalent
to treating control units with a placebo) and then evaluating whether the estimated treat-
ment effects for treatment counties are unusually large in magnitude relative to the effects
estimated for the control units in the post-intervention period (Abadie et al., 2010).6 If
multiple placebo units can produce “treatment” effects that are comparable to or large in
magnitude relative to those estimated for the treatment counties, then estimated designa-
tion effects for national monument counties cannot be considered statistically significant
(despite their nonzero values), as they are not one of the rare ones. This is akin to ob-
taining a nonzero treatment effect estimate from the difference-in-differences, but with a
large standard error, which renders the estimate insignificant.
One can complement the above (graphical) inference technique by computing the
ratio of the post-designation root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) to the pre-
designation RMSPE (Abadie et al., 2010). The post-treatment RMSPE for placebo units
should be similar to its pre-treatment RMSPE (because there is no treatment effect),
so the ratio of the two should be relatively small. If a treatment effect is present, one
should observe a larger deviation between actual and synthetic outcomes in treatment
units during the post designation period, thus yielding a larger post/pre RMSPE ratio. A
treatment effect would be considered statistically significant if it is one of very few large
post/pre RMSPE ratios. Ordering post/pre RSMPE ratios from largest to smallest, a
5The inference accuracy, however, increases with the number of control units and/or the number of
time periods (Cavallo et al., 2013).
6A natural question might be what effect(s) placebo units capture, if their values are nonzero. The
placebo effects for the placebo units can be attributed to broader economic and regional factors that
affect all the units (treatment and controls) equally. Hence, the primary goal of the falsification test is
to weed out the intervention effect from other common factors.
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unit with a significant treatment effect would appear at or near the top of the list. One
can interpret the percentage ranking as a p-value, i.e., an RMSPE ratio ranking third
out of 30 possible placebo tests would be equivalent to p-value=0.10 (Abadie et al., 2010,
2015).7
To refine inferences from the placebo analysis, we consider placebo units for which the
synthetic control method produces as good a fit as that for a treatment unit in the pre-
intervention period. Intuitively, a placebo unit with poor pre-intervention fit increases
inference uncertainty in the post-intervention period as the poor pre-intervention fit may
well extend to the post-intervention period. Thus, following Abadie et al. (2010) and
Cavallo et al. (2013), we include in the inferences control counties with pre-designation
RMSPEs that are less than or equal to twice the pre-designation RMSPE of a treatment
unit.
5 Study Regions and Data Sources
Our initial consideration set was every terrestrial national monument larger than 50,000
acres and established between 1970 and 2015. We then excluded (1) any monument with
a pre- or post-designation period of less than 10 years; (2) two monuments under Na-
tional Park Service management (Craters of the Moon NM and El Malpais NM); and
(3) five Clinton-era monuments established in six of Arizona’s 15 counties (the donor
pool is too small).8 Nine national monuments located in five western states satisfied our
criteria (Figure 1; Table 1). Six study monuments were designated by Antiquities Act
Proclamations made by President Clinton in 2000 or 2001 [California’s Carrizo Plain
and Giant Sequoia NMs; Colorado’s Canyon of the Ancients NM; Montana’s Upper Mis-
souri River Breaks NM (UMRBNM); Oregon’s Cascade-Siskiyou NM, and Washington’s
7Firpo and Possebom (2018), using extensive Monte Carlo analyses, show that the RMSPE test has
good properties with respect to size, power, and robustness.
8The host county of New Mexico’s NPS-managed El Malpais NM (114,000 acres) had a border change
in 1981, thus disrupting the pre-intervention period. Idaho’s 53,000 acre Craters of the Moon NM, created
in 1924 and managed by the NPS, had 400,000 BLM-managed acres added in 2001. The split management
and timing call into question the treatment and control conditions required for analysis. We also chose
to exclude four large Marine National Monuments (totaling over 750 million acres) established during
the late-2000s by President Bush, as well as BLM’s Grand Staircase-Escalante NM, which was studied
in depth by Jakus and Akhundjanov (2018).
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Hanford Reach NM]. Three study monuments were established through legislative action
[California’s Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains NM (SRSJNM); Oregon’s Newberry
NM; and Washington’s Mount St. Helens NM (MSHNM)].9
Our nine monuments provide a representative mix of large national monuments. BLM
is the management agency for four monuments, the US Forest Service (USFS) has pri-
mary management responsibility for three monuments, the US Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) manages one monument, and one monument is managed jointly by BLM and
USFS (Table 1). Archaeological, biological, and/or geological resources were included
as the scientific objects to be protected in the majority of monuments. Paleontological
resources were identified for three monuments. Recreational resources were to be explic-
itly protected in only the congressionally-designated SRSJNM. Energy resources (oil, gas,
and/or geothermal) were specifically designated as existing valid uses in four study mon-
uments. Nearly all monuments had active grazing leases, but only SRSJNM explicitly
listed grazing as a valid use. Timber and timber salvage activities were valid uses in two
monuments.
The six study monuments established under Antiquities Act proclamations are oper-
ated using the landscape principles outlined by Interior Secretary Babbitt while the three
congressionally-designated monuments follow management plans based on the enabling
legislation. Congressionally-enacted laws allowed for a broader range of activities within
a monument. For example, construction of roads and recreation facilities are permitted
in Newberry and MSH NMs, while Newberry NM allows a 30 year window (closing in
2020) to develop commercial quantities of geothermal energy should such resources be
discovered. The law for SRSJNM does not include such exceptions but does explicitly
state that there is to be no buffer between the monument and its adjacent urban area.
Analysis is based on data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017), the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017a,b), and the Bureau of Census (Minnesota Population
Center, 2016) from 1970-2015. A brief narrative sketch and descriptive statistics for each
of the nine study monuments and their donor pool can be found in Appendix A. The BEA
9Newberry NM and Mount St. Helens NM are officially known as National Volcanic Monuments
(NVM).
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data may be used to compare local economic conditions to broader, statewide conditions
for the pre- and post-designation periods for each monument (Table 2). Three standard
measures of economic well-being—compound annual growth rates in population, employ-
ment, and per capita income—are shown in Table 2. We have 60 county-level growth rate
comparisons (three each for twenty counties). Seven (11.7%) of the county-level measures
show faster county-level growth (an improvement of >0.5%) in the post-designation pe-
riod, 21 (35.0%) show roughly equal pre- and post-designation growth (±0.5%), while 32
(53.3%) demonstrate slower post-designation growth (a growth rate decline of >0.5%).
In comparison, there are no statewide measures that show faster post-designation growth
relative to the pre-designation period. Of the 24 pre- and post-designation growth rates
for states, five (20.8%) show roughly equal pre- and post-designation growth rates (within
0.5% of one another) and nineteen (79.2%) show slower post-designation growth (a decline
in excess of 0.5%).
Both advocates and opponents of national monuments can find support for their
respective positions in such data by selectively highlighting counties that have grown
faster or slower during the post-designation period and ignoring the remainder. However,
measures of economic well-being must be placed within the context of broader economic
forces: if a county and its state both experience slower growth following monument desig-
nation, can one say that slower local growth can be attributed entirely to the monument?
Clearly, changes in local economic conditions associated with the monument must be dis-
entangled from state and regional economic forces that affect all comparison units. This
is precisely what synthetic control provides as it selects from a broader pool of possible
donor units. Our modeling strategy is to capture state and regional economic trends by
defining each monument’s donor pool as composed of all the other counties in the state
of designation that did not have another monument designated during the time period of
interest, plus all border counties in other states if the given monument is located along a
state border.
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6 Empirical Results
The weights for the donor counties comprising each synthetic control were selected fol-
lowing the procedure detailed in Section 4. Empirical estimates of those weights for each
host county’s constructed synthetic control are reported in Appendix B. In the interest
of space, and given that the results are consistent across monuments, we provide illus-
trations of our synthetic control results for only the first monument, with the remainder
reported in online Appendix C.
6.1 Carrizo Plain NM
The dashed line in the graph on the left of Figure 2 illustrates the time path of per capita
income for the synthetic control whereas the solid line illustrates the actual time path for
San Luis Obispo county. The synthetic control closely tracks the actual path during the
pre-designation period, which suggests that the identifying assumption of the synthetic
control method is satisfied, after which the two lines depart from one another. The
actual path of per capita income is consistently greater than that of the synthetic control
during the post-designation period, suggesting that designation of the monument has
increased per capita income in the county. The mean difference between actual income
and the income predicted by the synthetic control in the post-designation period is a
point estimate of the annual effect of monument designation (i.e.,
∑T
t=T0+1
αˆ1t/(T −T0)).
The mean annual percentage difference between the actual path and the counterfactual
path is +1.83%, with a minimum gap of -0.90% and a maximum gap of +6.29% (Table 3).
The dark line in the graph on the right side of Figure 2 shows the (actual minus
synthetic) gap for the treatment county; the gray lines show the (actual minus synthetic)
gaps for the placebo tests as applied to the 34 control counties. It is apparent that
San Luis Obispo county is not the only county to demonstrate a consistently positive
designation effect, and many control units show similar, or larger, income gaps. Of
course, these counties did not have a monument designated within their borders, and the
variation in the observed gap must be due to other factors common to both treatment
and control counties. The post-designation/pre-designation RMSPE ratio for San Luis
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Obispo county was 1.92, but with that San Luis Obispo was ranked only 24th out of
the 35 units, yielding a p-value of 0.686 (Table 4). Therefore, the mean difference in
predicted per capita income for the synthetic control unit and what actually occurred in
the county is not statistically significant.
6.2 Giant Sequoia NM
The causal impact of the Giant Sequoia NM on its host counties’ per capita income is
presented in Figure C.1 (left side) in Appendix C. The monument designation seems to
have negatively affected per capita income in Fresno and Kern counties, with per capita
income declining on average by -3.99% and -2.04% per year, respectively, in the post-
designation period (Table 3). In contrast, the income trajectory of Tulare county and
its synthetic counterpart do not appear to diverge considerably during the 2000-2015
period, showing a modest growth of +0.53% per year on average (Table 3). Aggregately,
weighting the treatment effects by county population in each year, we obtain an estimated
region-wide mean gap of -2.35%, with a minimum of -3.34% and a maximum of -0.73%.
The falsification analysis demonstrates that the magnitude of the gaps observed for all
three treatment counties are easily reproduced by numerous placebo counties (right side
of Figure C.1). Further, according to the RMSPE test (Table 4), Fresno ranks 14th of 23,
Kern ranks 36th of 40, and Tulare ranks 47th of 47 counties in the post-designation/pre-
designation RMSPE ratio, yielding p-values of 0.609, 0.900, and 1, respectively. As a
result, we conclude that the monument designation has had no statistically significant
effect on county income.
6.3 Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains NM
Figure C.2 (left side) displays the per capita income trajectory of Riverside county, the
host of the Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains NM, and its synthetic counterpart.
The levels and trends of per capita income are fairly similar between the treated and
synthetic units in the pre-designation period, which suggests that the two units are rea-
sonably comparable in the post-intervention period. On average, over the years after the
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designation, the path of the synthetic control suggests a mean difference of -10.21%, with
a maximum of -4.54% and a minimum of -18.48%, from Riverside county’s actual path
(Table 3). This negative effect, however, is not robust to placebo tests, as several control
counties produce an effect of either similar or larger magnitude (right side of Figure C.2).
The RMSPE test confirms the lack of significance of the treatment effect, given Riverside
is placed behind 20 out of 45 counties, with an implied p-value of 0.444 (Table 4).
6.4 Canyon of the Ancients NM
In Figure C.3 (top left), the difference between the dashed synthetic control line for Do-
lores county and the actual income implies that monument designation caused a fall in
income. The estimated mean annual difference was in excess of -27% (Table 3). In con-
trast, the actual-synthetic gap for Montezuma county (bottom left of Figure C.3) has an
estimated mean post-designation actual–synthetic gap of +2.30% (Table 3). The pop-
ulations of the two counties are quite different, with Montezuma having more than 13
times the population of Dolores in 2015. Weighting the annual income gaps by popula-
tion in each year yields a region-wide estimated mean gap of +0.50%, with a minimum of
-3.05% and a maximum of +8.00%. The falsification tests for each county (right side of
Figure C.3) show relatively fewer placebo counties matching the magnitude of the gap ob-
served for Dolores county than Montezuma county. The post/pre RMSPE tests indicate
Dolores county ranked 14th of 62 and Montezuma ranked 41st of 44 counties. Conse-
quently, the income gaps in both Dolores and Montezuma counties are both statistically
insignificant, with p-values of 0.226 and 0.932, respectively (Table 4).
6.5 Upper Missouri River Breaks NM
The UMRB NM covers portions of four Montana counties. The graphs on the left side
of Figure C.4 look as if, for each treatment unit, the synthetic control unit had a higher
predicted per capita income than actually occurred. This suggests that monument desig-
nation has hurt the region’s economies. Mean annual income gaps in the post-designation
period were estimated to be -14.82%, -9.09%, -2.28%, and -1.31% for Blaine, Chouteau,
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Fergus, and Phillips counties, respectively (Table 3). Weighting by county population
over the post-designation period yields a predicted mean region-wide fall in per capita
income of -5.88%, with a minimum of -18.60% and a maximum of +0.81%. However,
falsification tests indicate that all of these point estimates are statistically insignificant,
with numerous placebo counties exhibiting income gaps of a similar or larger magnitude
as those for treatment counties (right side of Figure C.4). Blaine county comes closest to
being statistically significant, with its post/pre RMSPE ratio of 5.01 ranked 8th out of
42 counties, for a p-value of 0.191 (Table 4).
6.6 Cascade-Siskiyou NM
Figure C.5 (left side) shows that the actual and synthetic per capita income time paths for
Jackson county follow each other closely before the designation, with an apparent positive
divergence after the designation. In particular, the county is estimated to have gained
an average 2.65% in annual per capita income following designation, with a minimum
of 0.88% and a maximum of 5.53% (Table 3). However, placebo tests indicate that the
observed positive effect of the NM is not large relative to the effect estimated for placebo
units: there are several permutations that are either above or identical to the effect in
the treated unit (right side of Figure C.5). Jackson county ranks 8th out of 23 counties in
post/pre RMSPE ratio, with a p-value of 0.348 (Table 4), providing further evidence that
the designation has not caused a statistically significant change in the county income.
6.7 Newberry NM
The difference in per capita income between the actual and synthetic Deschutes county is
quite small up until the time of treatment (left side of Figure C.6). Following designation
of Newberry NM, the monument appears to have contributed to a somewhat higher
income level relative to its synthetic control. The average annual growth in the county
income is estimated to be +4.87%, with a minimum of -0.24% and a maximum of +8.68%,
during the post-designation period (Table 3). The positive effect, however, is not robust
because multiple control counties have a similar or larger magnitude of effects relative
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to that observed for the treatment county (right side of Figure C.6). In addition, the
RMSPE test ranks Deschutes county 13th out of 28 counties, with a p-value of 0.464
(Table 4). Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to claim that the NM has had a
positive effect on per capita income.
6.8 Hanford Reach NM
For each of the four host counties of Hanford Reach NM, the designation seems to be
associated with declines in per capita income (left side of Figure C.7). Although one
can observe similar trajectories in the four counties, the decline was more pronounced
in Adams and Franklin counties, with estimated mean annual income gaps of -8.78%
and -8.43%, respectively, and to a lesser degree in Benton, with an estimated mean
annual income gap of -2.69% (Table 3). Overall, the region has experienced an estimated
average -4.68% drop in per capita income in the post-designation period, with a minimum
of -11.92% and a maximum of +1.02%. The placebo tests indicate that relatively few
counties can replicate the treatment effect magnitudes seen for Adams and Franklin
counties, especially between 2010-2015, while the effects for Benton and Grant counties
are easily matched by several placebo counties (right side of Figure C.7). The RMSPE test
provides further clarity: the effect for Franklin county is the closest to being statistically
significant, with its post/pre RMSPE ratio ranked 6th out of 33 units, for an implied
p-value of 0.182; p-values for the remaining counties are all in excess of 0.5 (Table 4).
6.9 Mount St. Helens NM
Out of the nine monuments examined in this study, Mount St. Helens NM is the only
monument for which one might find a statistically significant designation effect. The
time paths of per capita income for each county and its synthetic counterpart (left side
of Figure C.8) show that each synthetic control closely matches its actual path in the
pre-treatment period, after which the lines appear to diverge substantially for Cowlitz
and Lewis counties, while remaining relatively steady for Skamania county. Once the gap
is established for Lewis county it stays somewhat constant; in contrast, the gap shrinks,
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and ultimately disappears, for Cowlitz county. More specifically, the synthetic control
analysis infers estimated mean annual income gaps of -5.05%, -10.77%, and -1.23% in
Cowlitz, Lewis, and Skamania counties, respectively, with the region-wide population-
weighted average decline of -7.01% (Table 3).
Our findings from the falsification analysis show that, once again, the estimate of the
designation effect is not statistically significant in any county. First, several placebo units
could replicate designation effects similar to or larger than that for Skamania (right side
of Figure C.8); second, the county ranks 28th out of 32 counties in the RMSPE test,
with a p-value of 0.875 (Table 4). Similarly, no treatment effect is measured for Cowlitz
county, with a p-value of 0.214 (ranking 3rd out of 14 counties). Of the twenty counties
reported in this study, Lewis county comes the closest to having a statistically significant
designation effect. With a post/pre RMSPE ratio of 8.61, Lewis is ranked 2nd out of
18 counties, which equates to a p-value of 0.111 (Table 4), just outside the critical value
needed to reject the null hypothesis of no designation effect.
7 Discussion
Of the twenty counties included in this analysis, none were found to have a statistically
significant national monument designation effect. Further, our results are quite robust to
the decision to retain only those donor units which closely track the pre-intervention time
path of treatment counties; when all possible donor counties are included, only one county
(MSHNM’s Lewis county, p-value=0.051) edges its way to significance (see Appendix D).
Given the intense debate over the economic effects of large national monuments, the fact
that we find no effect under the standard assumptions of synthetic control leads us to ask
why we get such a result. Our discussion begins with a closer look at Mount St. Helens
NM, which came nearest to significance. We then outline historic and recent institutional
dynamics that have dominated federal land ownership and management and, thus, are
likely to have limited the potential economic effects of all large national monuments.
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7.1 Why is There No Designation Effect for Mount St. Helens NVM?
Mount St. Helens National Volcanic Monument was established two years after a cata-
clysmic volcanic eruption on May 18, 1980. Some 57 people were killed as the lateral blast
left nearly 100,000 acres completely devoid of above ground life (USGS, 2013). Between
three and four billion board feet of timber were blown down in the blast zone or knocked
down by volcanic mudslides known as “lahars”. The bulk of infrastructure damage was to
Forest Service roads directly exposed to the lateral blast or located along rivers inundated
by lahars. With the exception of State Route 504, key transportation infrastructure was
merely inconvenienced by ashfall in a manner similar to a major snowstorm. River traffic
on the Columbia River was restricted for a month as volcanic sediment was dredged from
the blocked channel. The effect on commercial agriculture was mixed: ashfall in central
and eastern Washington destroyed the first cut of hay but unusually heavy post-eruption
rains both removed ash from crops and provided an excellent growing environment. Stud-
ies by the US International Trade Commission (USITC, 1980) and MacCready (1982) peg
post-eruption losses between $2.2 billion and $2.8 billion ($2015).10
The eruption leads one to question whether it, rather than monument designation,
is the appropriate exogenous event to model. Our strategy is to apply synthetic control
method to the three host counties of MSHNM with an intervention date of 1980 (eruption
year) instead of 1982 (designation year). The post-intervention period is limited to 1980-
1982, so that the eruption effect can be isolated from the potential designation effect.
The analysis is limited to 1970-1982, so we can include one of the host counties of yet-
to-be-designated Hanford Reach NM (Benton) in our donor pool, but we exclude eight
downwind counties suffering heavy ashfall (Adams, Franklin, Grant, Kittitas, Lincoln,
Spokane, Whitman, and Yakima). The donor pool consisted of 35 counties. Figure E.1
presents the results (see Appendix E).
Estimated mean annual eruption effects on per capita income are negative for Cowlitz
(-3.51%) and Lewis (-8.44%) counties, but positive for Skamania county (+3.41%). While
10The authors of both studies note that these costs exclude losses associated with private mitigating
actions (such as ash removal from private property), the additional maintenance costs for machinery and
tools exposed to volcanic ash, and damages to human health.
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the eruption resulted in a short-lived spike in unemployment, timber salvage and repair
operations rapidly lowered the unemployment rate. MacCready (1982) estimates immedi-
ate regional income losses at less than 1% of total losses. Our post/pre-eruption RMSPE
ratios yield p-values of 0.500, 0.154, and 0.167 for Cowlitz, Lewis, and Skamania counties,
respectively. Thus, in no case do we find a statistically significant eruption effect, which
is consistent with the surprise expressed by both USITC (1980) and MacCready (1982)
at their relatively slight short-term damage estimates.
The USITC (1980) warned that the volcano-related losses could grow over time, es-
pecially if the mountain were to remain seismically active, specifically noting that while
regional tourism may increase, the large, regional land protections proposed for ongoing
scientific study may “...have an adverse impact on the regional [timber] market (p.17).”
Further, uncertainty concerning future volcanic activity will “...raise the level of risk as-
sociated with investments in the region (p.31).” Should the volcano return to a dormant
state, though, the “...long term effects of the eruptions experienced so far will be small
(p.33).”
Mount St. Helens has remained far from dormant during the intervening time period
(Pacific Northwest Seismic Network, 2018). The major explosive events of 1980 were
followed by numerous minor explosions and lahars until October of 1986. Six small
eruptions produced ash over a 21-month period from 1989-1991. Major activity returned
in October 2004 and continued through January 2008; although there were only two
eruptions during this time, a dome of lava forming in the crater eventually reached a
height of 1500 feet above the crater floor. Swarms of earthquakes continue to this day,
most recently in January 2018.
The long-term conditions of greatest concern to the USITC have indeed transpired,
with ongoing seismic activity and monument status conferring regional land use restric-
tions on the timber industry. Astonishingly, the literature is devoid of any study of the
long-term impact of Mount St. Helens volcanic activity on the regional economy, so we
are left to interpret the analysis presented in this study. The timber industry—an im-
portant sector in the MSHNM region—struggled with relatively low prices throughout
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the 1980s, which have been followed by trade, environmental, and price pressures from
the 1990s through to the present day. Consequently, restricted access to the relatively
small MSHNM region may not have been economically meaningful within the context
of the broader industry trends that affect both treatment and donor units. Our results,
especially for Lewis county, hint at the USITC’s anticipated reductions in capital inflow
over the longer term, but the effects on income were insignificant.
7.2 Why is There No Designation Effect for Any of the Large National
Monuments?
The absence of a treatment effect in any of nine large national monuments closely corre-
sponds to results found for Utah’s Grand Staircase-Escalante NM, where the treatment
effect on its two host counties was also statistically insignificant (Jakus and Akhundjanov,
2018). This brings the total to ten monuments in 22 counties, all of which have failed
to show a significantly positive or negative effect on per capita income. Large national
monuments require tens of thousands of federally-owned acres, and any change in per
capita income will be tied closely to the industries supported by public lands. We hy-
pothesize that our results are driven by the nature of federal land and its management,
which differs systematically from other forms of land tenure in its potential to generate
market goods (i.e., grazing, timber, energy and mineral resources, and tourism).
First, physical and legal constraints are such that federal lands designated within a
large NM had never contributed much to the local economy during the pre-designation
period. From its founding, the United States federal government had maintained a policy
of land disposal through about 1940 (Vincent et al., 2017).11 Jakus et al. (2017) have es-
timated econometric models of current county-level land ownership patterns in mountain
west states and found that, relative to privately-owned or state-owned land, the lands
left under federal administration are concentrated in topographically rugged counties
with little arable land and below-average energy potential. That is, the largest swaths of
federal land exist in places where commercial opportunities are limited by the physical
11The authors note that 97% of federal land transfers to private ownership occurred prior to 1940.
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nature of the land. Federal lands are those where land claims were not patented due
to challenging geographic, environmental or economic conditions, or where land claims
were never filed. Today’s federal estate, by and large, exists because settlers, miners, and
energy companies could not profitably transfer land ownership into private hands under
the legal and economic conditions prevailing prior to 1940.
Despite having officially asserted in 1976 that most federal land would be retained in
federal ownership, much of the federal estate has remained accessible to lessees. Public
lands grazing is the dominant agricultural activity in regions with large tracts of federal
land. Sayre (2017) notes that rangelands exists because “...no one has found a way to
convert them profitably into other kinds of land (p.163).” Although public lands grazing
is extensive throughout the west, ranching is not a high-valued use of public land relative
to timber, energy or mineral resources.
Legal constraints have limited development of energy, timber and mineral resources
by lessees since 1970. The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) requires an
Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact Statement before harvest or extrac-
tion operations can begin. Exemptions to NEPA requirements occur, as in the Section
390 categorical exclusions (of the Energy Policy Act of 2005) that allow expedited review
for drilling on small acreages or small expansions of an existing drill field. However, Sec-
tion 390 exemptions are not permitted if environmental or cultural resources are subject
to significant impacts (Davis, 2016). Legal protections for environmental and cultural
resources have meant that in situ natural resources on federal lands designated as large
national monuments have been exploited only modestly, or not at all, over nearly five
decades. Finally, monument status is often overlaid atop existing, restrictive land classes
such as designated wilderness areas, wilderness study areas, wild and scenic rivers, and
other classifications.
During the post-designation period, the sunset provisions found in congressional acts
and the landscape-scale management principles promulgated by former Interior Secretary
Babbitt have meant that large national monuments have generated little local economic
impact. All national monument management plans emphasize protection of historic and
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scientific objects. In the case of recent Antiquities Act proclamations, such plans also ex-
plicitly restrict development of recreational resources—roads, campgrounds, and trails—
within the monument. This management approach limits tourism to only the most in-
trepid visitors, so that large national monuments do not generate the broadly positive
economic impacts of a national park (Wilkerson, 2003; Cline et al., 2011; Gabe, 2016).
However, it is unclear if this constraint on tourism infrastructure is effectively binding.
Newberry and MSH NMs—established by acts of Congress—are authorized to construct
roads and tourism facilities, yet our modeling failed to discern a significant difference in
the economic effects of these monuments and those established under the Antiquities Act.
In short, the public lands on which a monument resides had contributed little to the
local economy before designation, and have continued to contribute little after designa-
tion, so we do not observe an aggregate economic effect of the designation. However, we
do not claim that designation of national monuments has not had economic effects on
individual industries that comprise a local economy. For example, it would seem clear
that ranchers with allotments within a newly designated NM suddenly would be subject
to more costly and restrictive management guidelines, thus negatively affecting ranch
income. Conversely, an increase in tourism associated with NM designation would boost
the fortunes of the local leisure and hospitality industry. The analysis presented here
indicates that the negative and positive effects of monument designation wash out over
a relatively small geographic area.
8 Conclusions
We have examined the effect of nine large national monuments on county-level per capita
income in 20 counties in five states. Statistically significant effects were not present in any
of our treatment units. Mount St. Helens NM came closest to significance, but we cannot
be certain if the exogenous treatment was monument designation or the catastrophic
eruption occurring two years prior. Mount St. Helens NM notwithstanding, it would
appear that the economic effect of large national monuments on regional economies, as
measured by per capita income, have been exaggerated by both advocates and critics
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of national monuments. We hypothesize this result to be a function of institutional
factors associated with the historical disposal of the federal estate, historic and on-going
legal constraints on those who lease federal lands for harvest or extraction of marketable
resources, and restrictive post-designation land management policies. We suspect that,
in time, similar results will be found for other recently designated landscape-scale NMs
in the western United States operating under similar management regimes. Despite our
rather firm conclusion regarding effects of landscape-scale national monuments on regional
per capita income, this study still leaves wide scope for future analyses.
First, the regional scale of our analysis has been the county, and our modeling strongly
indicates that the economic consequences of monument designation wash out over this
relatively small geographic unit. However, county-level measures are likely to mask differ-
ing impacts of designation across the industries and communities that comprise a regional
economy. A study at the Census Designated Place (CDP) level might allow one to discern
statistically significant effects across CDPs of differing characteristics. If so, this would
permit the policy maker to consider targeted management policies for different places
depending upon the expected post-designation effects.
Second, while our outcome of interest (per capita income) succinctly captures the
numerous dimensions of community economic well-being into a single measure, the effect
of monument designation on its constituent elements remain rather opaque. That is,
the dynamic effects of monument designation could differ across wage income, non-wage
income, and population. For example, large monuments are presumed to cause changes in
economic structure, namely, shifts from relatively high-paying, but volatile, commodity
industries to relatively low-paying, but seasonal, industries. Do these industries adjust at
the same rate? If not, what are the effects on aggregate wage income? Per capita income
includes transfer payments, so how do these respond to changes in economic structure? If,
say, per capita income has been held constant due to increases in transfer payments, can
one claim that designation has had no economic effect? Further, amenity-based migration
will affect both non-wage income and population in a region. To what degree does non-
wage income substitute for wage income? Thus, while per capita income proved to be
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a convenient and worthwhile outcome measure in this initial study, its use may obscure
the dynamic complexity of a region’s economic response to landscape-scale monuments.
Third, another economic measure that may respond to monument designation is prop-
erty value. This is a potentially important issue because, although national monuments
follow similar management principles in that they “grandfather” existing commercial uses
of the land (while restricting future growth), monuments are likely to be heterogeneous in
their ability to attract amenity-based migrants. In communities adjacent to monuments
with few of the scenic, recreational, and climate attributes that attract migrants, con-
straints on industry growth and limited employment opportunities may cause property
values (wealth) to fall even as per capita income stays constant. In contrast, communities
located adjacent to monuments with attributes that appeal to migrants may see property
values bid higher. To our knowledge, no one has yet studied this question in the context
of national monuments.
Finally, the hypothesis tested in this study has been framed by the political debate
over monuments; our study does not address a question that may be greater interest to
economists: does designation of a large national monument satisfy a benefit-cost test? In
this case, one must measure the use and nonuse benefits associated with the protections
afforded by designation, and compare these to the incremental cost of managing public
land as a national monument and the opportunity cost of foregone commercial activity on
the land (primarily agriculture, forestry, energy, and mining). This question is especially
germane because the raison d’etre of national monuments lies in the preservation and
scientific values of protected objects—values which are not reflected in market outcomes—
yet no one has attempted such a study. It is in this calculation that one might expect to
observe greater variation across large national monuments, with some monuments passing
a benefit cost test and others failing.
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Table 2: County and State Compound Annual Growth Rates (%), Pre-
and Post-Designation (1970-2015)
Population Employment Per Capita Income
Growth (%) Growth (%) Growth (%)
Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
Carrizo Plain, California (2001)
San Luis Obispo 2.82 0.81 4.23 1.36 2.51 1.65
State of California 1.77 0.91 2.48 1.13 2.03 1.41
Giant Sequoia, California (2000)
Fresno 2.22 1.32 2.69 1.19 1.59 1.27
Kern 2.35 1.91 2.72 1.81 1.25 1.85
Tulare 2.25 1.49 2.54 1.05 1.38 2.15
State of California 1.78 0.95 2.54 1.09 2.11 1.30
Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains, California (2000)
Riverside 4.15 2.81 4.53 2.73 1.37 0.63
State of California 1.78 0.95 2.54 1.09 2.11 1.30
Canyon of the Ancients, Colorado (2000)
Dolores 0.41 0.46 1.41 2.49 3.02 3.05
Montezuma 2.03 0.62 3.29 0.45 3.00 1.48
State of Colorado 2.24 1.56 3.53 1.34 2.74 0.75
Upper Missouri River Breaks, Montana (2001)
Blaine 0.00 -0.18 0.07 -0.44 1.26 1.27
Chouteau -0.29 -0.16 0.01 -0.69 0.21 1.72
Fergus -0.24 -0.19 0.75 0.24 2.89 1.62
Phillips -0.58 -0.54 0.56 -0.04 1.56 2.04
State of Montana 0.85 0.93 2.02 1.20 1.89 1.95
Cascade-Siskiyou, Oregon (2000)
Jackson 2.17 1.05 3.56 0.89 2.47 1.16
State of Oregon 1.65 1.08 2.75 0.89 2.32 0.90
Newberry, Oregon (1990)
Deschutes 4.61 3.40 6.19 3.54 2.26 1.61
State of Oregon 1.56 1.38 2.86 1.55 2.17 1.59
Hanford Reach, Washington (2000)
Adams 1.02 1.05 0.73 0.35 0.75 2.54
Benton 2.53 1.92 3.44 2.05 2.09 1.18
Franklin 2.19 3.96 2.31 3.16 1.17 1.58
Grant 1.93 1.47 2.38 1.55 1.59 1.99
State of Washington 1.84 1.30 2.91 1.16 2.45 1.12
Mount St. Helens, Washington (1982)
Cowlitz 1.16 0.82 1.22 1.08 1.72 1.69
Lewis 1.90 0.86 2.50 0.92 1.54 1.62
Skamania 2.21 1.23 1.45 0.96 1.85 2.07
State of Washington 1.89 1.58 2.87 2.13 1.91 2.04
Note: Pre-designation growth rates calculated from 1970 through the year-
of-designation; post-designation growth rates calculated from year-of-designation
through 2015.
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Table 3: Estimated Annual Treatment Effects
as % of Per Capita Income ($2015)
Mean Min Max
Carrizo Plain, California
San Luis Obispo 1.83 -0.90 6.29
Giant Sequoia, California
Fresno -3.99 -7.91 0.42
Kern -2.04 -5.96 3.04
Tulare 0.53 -3.45 3.99
Population-weighted -2.35 -3.34 -0.73
Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains, California
Riverside -10.21 -18.48 -4.54
Canyon of the Ancients, Colorado
Dolores -27.33 -50.13 5.36
Montezuma 2.30 -1.45 8.22
Population-weighted 0.50 -3.05 8.00
Upper Missouri River Breaks, Montana
Blaine -14.82 -41.39 -3.83
Chouteau -9.09 -25.36 6.88
Fergus -2.28 -10.00 2.72
Phillips -1.31 -17.55 7.82
Population-weighted -5.88 -18.60 0.81
Cascade-Siskiyou, Oregon
Jackson 2.65 0.88 5.53
Newberry, Oregon
Deschutes 4.87 -0.24 8.68
Hanford Reach, Washington
Adams -8.78 -20.46 2.64
Benton -2.69 -10.75 7.02
Franklin -8.43 -18.43 -2.69
Grant -5.71 -8.94 -2.78
Population-weighted -4.68 -11.92 1.02
Mount St. Helens, Washington
Cowlitz -5.05 -15.27 1.74
Lewis -10.77 -15.41 -1.01
Skamania -1.23 -8.93 6.90
Population-weighted -7.01 -14.55 -0.23
Note: Mean annual treatment effect is calculated by tak-
ing the average of differences between the treatment out-
come and its synthetic counterpart (actual–synthetic) for
the post-intervention period. Population-weighted effect
is a region-wide mean estimated gap, which is obtained
by weighing the treatment effects by county population
in each year.
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Table 4: RMSPE Tests
Post/Pre Max/Min
Treatment Unit
Percentage
RMSPE Ratio (All Units)
Rank / # of
All Units
Carrizo Plain, California
San Luis Obispo 1.92 12.51/1.02 24/35 68.57%
Giant Sequoia, California
Fresno 3.53 11.58/1.23 14/23 60.87%
Kern 1.48 11.58/1.11 36/40 90.00%
Tulare 0.70 11.58/0.70 47/47 100%
Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains, California
Riverside 3.05 10.81/0.72 20/45 44.44%
Canyon of the Ancients, Colorado
Dolores 3.85 22.73/0.60 14/62 22.58%
Montezuma 1.24 22.73/0.60 41/44 93.18%
Upper Missouri River Breaks, Montana
Blaine 5.01 18.03/0.80 8/42 19.05%
Chouteau 1.23 18.03/0.79 44/52 84.60%
Fergus 2.23 18.03/0.83 19/31 61.29%
Phillips 2.12 18.03/0.80 24/44 54.54%
Cascade-Siskiyou, Oregon
Jackson 2.47 8.71/0.88 8/23 34.78%
Newberry, Oregon
Deschutes 2.53 8.52/0.67 13/28 46.43%
Hanford Reach, Washington
Adams 1.53 7.35/0.76 27/39 69.23%
Benton 1.73 7.35/0.76 23/36 63.89%
Franklin 3.13 7.35/0.76 6/33 18.18%
Grant 1.98 7.35/0.76 18/33 54.54%
Mount St. Helens, Washington
Cowlitz 6.65 9.21/1.52 3/14 21.43%
Lewis 8.61 9.21/1.52 2/18 11.11%
Skamania 1.08 9.21/0.50 28/32 87.50%
Note: The RMSPE tests are based on placebo units for which pre-designation RMSPEs are
less than or equal to twice the pre-designation RMSPE of a treatment county. Max/Min
indicates the maximum/minimum post/pre RMSPE ratio from placebo runs, including the
RMSPE of the treatment unit. Percentage is a proxy for p-value, which is obtained from the
ratio of the treatment unit rank to the number of all units (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015).
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Figure 1: Map of Study Region
Note: The nine monuments shown with boundaries are discussed in the text; circles
are scaled to show relative size of other landscape-scale national monuments.
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Figure 2: Carrizo Plain NM, California (San Luis Obispo county)
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Appendix (For Online Publication)
A Descriptive Statistics for Each Study Region
A.1 Carrizo Plain NM, California
Carrizo Plain NM is located on over 200,000 acres at the eastern end of San Luis Obispo
county, approximately 150 miles southwest of Sequoia National Park.12 Approximately
16% of the monument is non-federal land. Similar to other monuments, Carrizo Plain has
active grazing leases; oil and gas rights are held on 30,000 acres. The monument is also
home to a single Wilderness Study Area (WSA). San Luis Obispo county had a population
of 281,401 in 2015, with a per capita income of $49,873 (about 93% of California’s per
capita income). During the post-designation period San Luis Obispo county grew more
slowly than pre-designation, as did the remainder of the state (Table 2). The set of
donor counties was composed of 53 California counties. The California counties excluded
from the analysis were Fresno, Kern, and Tulare counties, home to Giant Sequoia NM,
and Riverside county, home to Santa Rosa and San Jacinto NM. Both monuments were
designated in 2000. Descriptive statistics and time plots of per capita income for the
Carrizo Plain NM analysis appear in Table A.1 and Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Time Path of Per Capita Income, Carrizo Plain NM, California
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12A very small portion of Carrizo Plain NM is in Kern county.
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Table A.1: County Characteristics, Carrizo Plain NM, California
Variable Source N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Per capita income ($2015) BEA 2484 33,605.05 12,999.35
Population density BEA 2484 609.26 2,195.04
% total income from farms BEA 2484 3.70 6.38
Annual growth, all employment BEA 2484 2.23 3.65
Annual growth, farm employment BEA 2484 0.42 8.42
Annual growth, private nonfarm BEA 2484 2.64 4.65
employment
Annual growth, government BEA 2484 1.46 4.00
employment
% farm employment BEA 2484 5.83 6.51
% private nonfarm employment BEA 2484 74.55 10.85
% government employment BEA 2484 19.62 8.19
Industrial mix employment growth BEA 486 1.06 0.05
(farm, private nonfarm, gov’t)
% population, female Census 270 49.58 1.96
% population, nonwhite Census 270 18.99 13.76
% population over age 15, married Census 270 57.25 7.23
% population, college graduate Census 270 17.70 8.90
% population over age 16, in Census 270 59.58 6.86
labor force
% population, living in poverty Census 270 12.83 3.98
Unemployment rate Census, 1512 8.81 4.24
BLS
Note: The data includes 1 treatment county and 53 donor counties in California for 1970-
2015. The California counties excluded from the analysis were Fresno, Kern, and Tulare
counties, home to Giant Sequoia NM, and Riverside county, home to Santa Rosa and San
Jacinto NM. Industrial mix employment growth is measured at five-year intervals following
Partridge et al. (2012). BEA data is from interactive data tables (Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2017). Census data is from Minnesota Population Center (2016). Unemployment
data for 1970 and 1980 is from Census and for 1990-2015 is from Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2017b).
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A.2 Giant Sequoia NM, California
The 328,000 acre Giant Sequoia NM is composed of two non-contiguous segments located
in three central California counties (Fresno, Kern, and Tulare). Nearly 18,000 acres have
wilderness or wild and scenic river designations. Portions of the monument are adjacent
to Kings Canyon and Sequoia National Parks. Some 2.3 million people reside in the
host counties, with 2015 per capita income of ranging between $36,500 and $38,300, or
about 70% of California’s per capita income. During the post-designation period, per
capita income in Kern and Tulare counties grew a bit faster than the state as a whole
(Table 2). The set of donor counties was composed of 53 California counties. California
counties excluded from the analysis were San Luis Obispo, home to Carrizo Plain NM
(designated in 2001), and Riverside county, home to Santa Rosa and San Jacinto NM
(2000). Descriptive statistics and time plots of per capita income for the Giant Sequoia
NM analysis appear in Table A.2 and Figure A.2.
Figure A.2: Time Path of Per Capita Income, Giant Sequoia NM, California
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Table A.2: County Characteristics, Giant Sequoia NM, California
Variable Source N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Per capita income ($2015) BEA 2576 33,289.94 12,831.72
Population density BEA 2576 590.96 2,157.58
% total income from farms BEA 2576 3.95 6.39
Annual growth, all employment BEA 2576 2.21 3.60
Annual growth, farm employment BEA 2576 0.40 8.38
Annual growth, private nonfarm BEA 2576 2.61 4.58
employment
Annual growth, government BEA 2576 1.48 3.95
employment
% farm employment BEA 2576 6.08 6.55
% private nonfarm employment BEA 2576 74.39 10.68
% government employment BEA 2576 19.53 8.06
Industrial mix employment growth BEA 504 1.06 0.05
(farm, private nonfarm, gov’t)
% population, female Census 280 49.63 1.92
% population, nonwhite Census 280 19.71 14.00
% population over age 15, married Census 280 57.30 7.20
% population, college graduate Census 280 17.35 8.81
% population over age 16, in Census 280 59.64 6.72
labor force
% population, living in poverty Census 280 13.19 4.27
Unemployment rate Census, 1568 9.04 4.27
BLS
Note: The data includes 3 treatment counties and 53 donor counties in California for 1970-
2015. The California counties excluded from the analysis were San Luis Obispo, home to
Carrizo Plain NM, and Riverside county, home to Santa Rosa and San Jacinto NM. Industrial
mix employment growth is measured at five-year intervals following Partridge et al. (2012).
BEA data is from interactive data tables (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017). Census data
is from Minnesota Population Center (2016). Unemployment data for 1970 and 1980 is from
Census and for 1990-2015 is from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017b).
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A.3 Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains NM, California
The nearly 300,000 acre Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains NM is located in southern
California’s Riverside county. The SRSJM NM abuts the resort communities clustered
around Palm Springs and is subject to attendant development pressures. Some 20% of
the monument’s acreage is composed of privately held parcels, while 35% is officially
designated as wilderness. The Pacific Crest Trail traverses a portion of the monument.
Riverside county is among the largest and most populated counties in the nation, with
almost 2.4 million people in 2015. Its 2015 per capita income was $35,600, or about 66% of
California’s per capita income. Similar to the state as a whole, population, employment,
and per capita income grew more slowly in the post-designation period relative to the
pre-designation period (Table 2). The set of donor counties was composed of 53 California
counties. The California counties excluded from the analysis were San Luis Obispo, home
to Carrizo Plain NM (designated in 2001), and Fresno, Kern and Tulare counties which
are home to Giant Sequoia NM (2000). Descriptive statistics and time plots of per capita
income for the Giant Sequoia NM analysis appear in Table A.3 and Figure A.3.
Figure A.3: Time Path of Per Capita Income, Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Moun-
tains NM, California
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Table A.3: County Characteristics, Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains NM,
California
Variable Source N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Per capita income ($2015) BEA 2484 33,525.42 12,969.29
Population density BEA 2484 609.42 2195.00
% total income from farms BEA 2484 3.77 6.40
Annual growth, all employment BEA 2484 2.21 3.64
Annual growth, farm employment BEA 2484 0.42 8.40
Annual growth, private nonfarm BEA 2484 2.62 4.64
employment
Annual growth, government BEA 2484 1.46 3.99
employment
% farm employment BEA 2484 5.89 6.52
% private nonfarm employment BEA 2484 74.44 10.83
% government employment BEA 2484 19.67 8.17
Industrial mix employment growth BEA 486 1.06 0.05
(farm, private nonfarm, gov’t)
% population, female Census 270 49.60 1.95
% population, nonwhite Census 270 19.30 13.85
% population over age 15, married Census 270 57.33 7.25
% population, college graduate Census 270 17.54 8.89
% population over age 16, in Census 270 59.64 6.82
labor force
% population, living in poverty Census 270 12.91 4.05
Unemployment rate Census, 1512 8.91 4.24
BLS
Note: The data includes 1 treatment county and 53 donor counties in California for 1970-
2015. The California counties excluded from the analysis were San Luis Obispo, home to
Carrizo Plain NM, and Fresno, Kern, and Tulare counties, home to Giant Sequoia NM.
Industrial mix employment growth is measured at five-year intervals following Partridge
et al. (2012). BEA data is from interactive data tables (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017).
Census data is from Minnesota Population Center (2016). Unemployment data for 1970 and
1980 is from Census and for 1990-2015 is from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017b).
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A.4 Canyon of the Ancients NM, Colorado
Canyon of the Ancients NM is in the Four Corners portion of southwestern Colorado,
about 20 miles west of Mesa Verde NP (which received 547,000 visitors in 2015). The
monument, located in counties that border Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, surrounds
three Colorado portions of the smaller, previously established Hovenweep NM and also
encompasses three WSAs. At the time of designation, most of the monument’s area
had been leased for grazing and/or energy development. In 2015, Dolores county was
home to 1,978 people whereas the population of Montezuma county was 26,168. County
per capita incomes in the region were $38,393 and $42,715 for Dolores and Montezuma
counties, respectively. Colorado’s per capita income in 2015 was $50,899. Similar to the
state as a whole, Montezuma county had slower population, employment and per capita
income growth after designation of the monument, but Dolores county bucked this trend
for population and employment growth (Table 2). Per capita income growth in Dolores
county was slower in the post-designation period. The Canyon of the Ancients data set
is composed of 2 treatment counties and 67 donor counties. The set of donor counties
includes 57 counties in Colorado, plus 10 border counties in Arizona (Apache), New
Mexico (Colfax, Rio Arriba, San Juan, Taos, Union), and Utah (Daggett, Grand, San
Juan, and Uintah).13 Descriptive statistics and time plots of income appear in Table A.4
and Figure A.4.
Figure A.4: Time Path of Per Capita Income, Canyon of the Ancients NM, Col-
orado
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13Five Colorado counties were dropped from the donor pool due to data discontinuity when Broomfield
county was formed from portions of Adams, Boulder, Jefferson, and Weld counties in 2001.
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Table A.4: County Characteristics, Canyon of the Ancients NM, Colorado
Variable Source N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Per capita income ($2015) BEA 3174 29,099.81 12,352.98
Population density BEA 3174 73.27 424.33
% total income from farms BEA 3174 6.25 10.49
Annual growth, all employment BEA 3174 2.54 7.54
Annual growth, farm employment BEA 3174 0.47 8.51
Annual growth, private nonfarm BEA 3174 3.22 9.69
employment
Annual growth, government BEA 3174 1.91 4.94
employment
% farm employment BEA 3174 11.77 11.72
% private nonfarm employment BEA 3174 69.38 15.30
% government employment BEA 3174 19.06 8.19
Industrial mix employment growth BEA 621 1.05 0.05
(farm, private nonfarm, gov’t)
% population, female Census 345 49.07 2.66
% population, nonwhite Census 345 11.02 13.95
% population over age 15, married Census 345 60.53 8.03
% population, college graduate Census 345 18.35 10.67
% population over age 16, in Census 345 61.58 10.30
labor force
% population, living in poverty Census 345 15.35 7.71
Unemployment rate Census, 1932 5.59 2.94
BLS
Note: The data includes 2 treatment counties and 67 donor counties for 1970-2015. The set
of donor counties includes 57 counties in Colorado, plus 10 border counties in Arizona, New
Mexico, and Utah. Industrial mix employment growth is measured at five-year intervals fol-
lowing Partridge et al. (2012). BEA data is from interactive data tables (Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2017). Census data is from Minnesota Population Center (2016). Unemployment
data for 1970 and 1980 is from Census and for 1990-2015 is from Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2017b).
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A.5 Upper Missouri River Breaks NM, Montana
The Northern Great Plains of eastern Montana host the Upper Missouri River Breaks
NM, about 175 miles southeast of Glacier National Park. The Upper Missouri River
within the monument enjoys designation as a Wild and Scenic River; the monument also
includes portions of the Lewis and Clark and Nez Perce National Historic Trails. Unlike
our comparison monuments, the UMRB includes substantial private inholdings on which
livestock are grazed. The four counties on which the UMRB is located make up 2.7% of
Montana’s total population, by far the largest proportion of the three study monuments.
Host county per capita incomes in 2015 ranged between 65% (Blaine) and 92% (Fergus)
of Montana’s 2015 per capita income of $41,809. Three of the four treatment counties
had negative population growth prior to designation while the fourth had zero growth.
Population losses have continued in all counties during the post-designation period (Ta-
ble 2). Employment growth was essentially nil both before and after designation of the
monument. In all cases, population and employment growth lags substantially behind the
growth rates of the state as a whole. Perhaps due to population and employment losses,
per capita income growth in the treatment counties has kept pace with that of Montana
in the post-designation time frame. The donor pool for the UMRB analysis consists of the
other 52 counties in Montana. Descriptive statistics and income time plots are reported
in Table A.5 and Figure A.5.
Figure A.5: Time Path of Per Capita Income, Upper Missouri River Breaks NM,
Montana
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Table A.5: County Characteristics, Upper Missouri River Breaks NM, Montana
Variable Source N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Per capita income ($2015) BEA 2576 26,672.67 8,223.30
Population density BEA 2576 6.58 10.77
% total income from farms BEA 2576 8.76 12.08
Annual growth, all employment BEA 2576 0.92 3.73
Annual growth, farm employment BEA 2576 -0.33 3.93
Annual growth, private nonfarm BEA 2576 1.53 6.03
employment
Annual growth, government BEA 2576 0.63 4.10
employment
% farm employment BEA 2576 18.71 13.20
% private nonfarm employment BEA 2576 62.50 14.01
% government employment BEA 2576 18.79 6.17
Industrial mix employment growth BEA 504 1.04 0.05
(farm, private nonfarm, gov’t)
% population, female Census 280 49.51 1.53
% population, nonwhite Census 280 7.66 13.47
% population over age 15, married Census 280 62.00 5.81
% population, college graduate Census 280 15.21 6.28
% population over age 16, in Census 280 60.19 5.81
labor force
% population, living in poverty Census 280 15.88 5.35
Unemployment rate Census, 1568 5.19 2.46
BLS
Note: The data includes 4 treatment counties and 52 donor counties in Montana for 1970-
2015. Industrial mix employment growth is measured at five-year intervals following Par-
tridge et al. (2012). BEA data is from interactive data tables (Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2017). Census data is from Minnesota Population Center (2016). Unemployment data for
1970 and 1980 is from Census and for 1990-2015 is from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017b).
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A.6 Cascade-Siskiyou NM, Oregon
The Cascade-Siskiyou NM is located on 65,000 acres in southwestern Oregon’s Jackson
county. The monument, adjacent to the California border, was later enlarged by Pres-
ident Obama in a 2017 Antiquities Act proclamation, but that expansion is occurred
after our time frame of analysis. The monument is home to a Wilderness Study Area
and a portion of the Pacific Crest Trail. Some 32,000 acres of private land is within
monument boundaries. Jackson county’s 2015 per capita income of almost $40,700 was
approximately 93% of Oregon’s per capita income. Similar to the state of Oregon, Jack-
son county population, employment, and per capita income grew more slowly in the
post-designation period than in the pre-designation period (Table 2). The donor pool for
the Cascade-Siskiyou NM analysis consists of 34 counties in Oregon (excluding Deschutes
county, home to the Newberry NM established in 1990) and three California border coun-
ties (Del Norte, Modoc, and Siskiyou). Descriptive statistics and income time plots are
reported in Table A.6 and Figure A.6.
Figure A.6: Time Path of Per Capita Income, Cascade-Siskiyou NM, Oregon
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Table A.6: County Characteristics, Cascade-Siskiyou NM, Oregon
Variable Source N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Per capita income ($2015) BEA 1748 28,113.47 7,048.51
Population density BEA 1748 84.19 245.31
% total income from farms BEA 1748 4.41 7.76
Annual growth, all employment BEA 1748 1.47 3.42
Annual growth, farm employment BEA 1748 0.01 5.39
Annual growth, private nonfarm BEA 1748 1.84 4.98
employment
Annual growth, government BEA 1748 1.11 4.05
employment
% farm employment BEA 1748 10.81 9.14
% private nonfarm employment BEA 1748 71.24 11.72
% government employment BEA 1748 17.95 5.54
Industrial mix employment growth BEA 342 1.05 0.05
(farm, private nonfarm, gov’t)
% population, female Census 190 50.05 1.14
% population, nonwhite Census 190 7.66 7.01
% population over age 15, married Census 190 61.47 6.68
% population, college graduate Census 190 15.26 6.86
% population over age 16, in Census 190 59.12 5.21
labor force
% population, living in poverty Census 190 13.30 3.22
Unemployment rate Census, 1064 7.95 2.62
BLS
Note: The data includes 1 treatment county and 37 donor counties for 1970-2015. The set
of donor counties includes 34 counties in Oregon, plus 3 border counties in California. The
Oregon county excluded from the analysis was Deschutes, home to Newberry NM. Industrial
mix employment growth is measured at five-year intervals following Partridge et al. (2012).
BEA data is from interactive data tables (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017). Census data
is from Minnesota Population Center (2016). Unemployment data for 1970 and 1980 is from
Census and for 1990-2015 is from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017b).
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A.7 Newberry NVM, Oregon
The 57,000 acre Newberry National Volcanic Monument is located Deschutes county, just
south of Bend in central Oregon. The monument does not have any designated wilderness
or wilderness study areas; private inholdings are not mentioned in planning documents.
Deschutes county had a 2015 per capita income of just over $44,435, was approximately
102% of Oregon’s per capita income. Similar to the state of Oregon, Deschutes county
population, employment, and per capita income grew more slowly in the post-designation
period than in the pre-designation period (Table 2). The donor pool for the Newberry
NVM analysis consists of the 34 counties in Oregon (excluding Jackson county, home to
the Cascade-Siskiyou NM established in 2000). Descriptive statistics and income time
plots are reported in Table A.7 and Figure A.7.
Figure A.7: Time Path of Per Capita Income, Newberry NM, Oregon
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Table A.7: County Characteristics, Newberry NM, Oregon
Variable Source N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Per capita income ($2015) BEA 1610 28,296.20 7,188.40
Population density BEA 1610 89.76 254.75
% total income from farms BEA 1610 4.24 21.04
Annual growth, all employment BEA 1610 1.59 3.52
Annual growth, farm employment BEA 1610 0.07 5.20
Annual growth, private nonfarm BEA 1610 1.98 5.13
employment
Annual growth, government BEA 1610 1.14 3.74
employment
% farm employment BEA 1610 10.86 9.32
% private nonfarm employment BEA 1610 71.82 11.87
% government employment BEA 1610 17.32 5.17
Industrial mix employment growth BEA 315 1.05 0.05
(farm, private nonfarm, gov’t)
% population, female Census 175 50.13 0.96
% population, nonwhite Census 175 7.13 6.50
% population over age 15, married Census 175 61.74 6.54
% population, college graduate Census 175 15.34 6.94
% population over age 16, in Census 175 59.44 5.04
labor force
% population, living in poverty Census 175 13.22 3.22
Unemployment rate Census, 980 7.69 2.45
BLS
Note: The data includes 1 treatment county and 34 donor counties in Oregon for 1970-2015.
The Oregon county excluded from the analysis was Jackson, home to Cascade-Siskiyou NM.
Industrial mix employment growth is measured at five-year intervals following Partridge
et al. (2012). BEA data is from interactive data tables (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017).
Census data is from Minnesota Population Center (2016). Unemployment data for 1970 and
1980 is from Census and for 1990-2015 is from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017b).
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A.8 Hanford Reach NM, Washington
Hanford Reach NM consists of almost 200,000 acres located in four counties of south cen-
tral Washington. The monument, which borders Oregon, was formerly home to national
nuclear research laboratory known as Hanford Engineering Works. With the exception of
a portion of Homestead Island in the middle of the Columbia River, the monument has
no private inholdings. Although portions of the monument have been found to be eligi-
ble for wilderness or wild and scenic river status, no such designations have been made.
The Saddle Mountain portion of the monument is designated as a wildlife management
unit. The four counties that host the monument had 2015 per capita incomes ranging
from $34,000 (Franklin) to just over $43,500 (Benton). This corresponds to between 65%
and 84% of Washington’s per capita income ($51,900). Although Washington state had
slower post-designation growth relative to the pre-designation period in population, em-
ployment and per capita income, three of the four counties that host Hanford Reach NM
had faster post-designation growth in per capita income and one enjoyed faster popu-
lation growth (Table 2). The donor pool for the Hanford Reach NM analysis consists
of 42 counties. These include 32 counties in Washington (excluding Cowlitz, Lewis and
Skamania counties, home to Mount St. Helens NVM established in 1982) and 10 Oregon
counties located along the Washington border. Descriptive statistics and income time
plots are reported in Table A.8 and Figure A.8.
Figure A.8: Time Path of Per Capita Income, Hanford Reach NM, Washington
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Table A.8: County Characteristics, Hanford Reach NM, Washington
Variable Source N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Per capita income ($2015) BEA 2116 30,169.08 8,507.30
Population density BEA 2116 117.19 256.26
% total income from farms BEA 2116 6.02 9.00
Annual growth, all employment BEA 2116 1.77 3.73
Annual growth, farm employment BEA 2116 0.45 7.68
Annual growth, private nonfarm BEA 2116 2.24 5.38
employment
Annual growth, government BEA 2116 1.45 3.45
employment
% farm employment BEA 2116 10.72 9.77
% private nonfarm employment BEA 2116 68.87 12.49
% government employment BEA 2116 20.43 8.64
Industrial mix employment growth BEA 414 1.05 0.05
(farm, private nonfarm, gov’t)
% population, female Census 230 49.97 0.99
% population, nonwhite Census 230 9.54 8.24
% population over age 15, married Census 230 60.73 6.74
% population, college graduate Census 230 16.02 7.41
% population over age 16, in Census 230 59.46 5.64
labor force
% population, living in poverty Census 230 13.40 4.02
Unemployment rate Census, 1288 7.60 2.61
BLS
Note: The data includes 4 treatment counties and 42 donor counties for 1970-2015. The set
of donor counties includes 32 counties in Washington, plus 10 border counties in Oregon.
The Washington counties excluded from the analysis were Cowlitz, Lewis, and Skamania,
home to Mount St. Helens NM. Industrial mix employment growth is measured at five-year
intervals following Partridge et al. (2012). BEA data is from interactive data tables (Bureau
of Economic Analysis, 2017). Census data is from Minnesota Population Center (2016).
Unemployment data for 1970 and 1980 is from Census and for 1990-2015 is from Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2017b).
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A.9 Mount St. Helens NVM, Washington
The 113,000 acre Mount St. Helens National Volcanic Monument was established by
Congress two years after the massive volcanic eruption on May 18, 1980. There are no
additional protective land designations within the monument. The three counties that
host the monument had 2015 per capita incomes ranging from $37,500 (Lewis) to just over
$40,300 (Cowlitz), or about 75% of Washington’s per capita income ($51,900). Similar to
the state of Washington, all three counties that host Mount St. Helens NVM had rates
of post-designation per capita income growth that equaled or exceeded pre-designation
growth rates (Table 2). The donor pool for Mount St. Helens NVM analysis consists of 42
counties. These include 32 counties in Washington (excluding Adams, Benton, Franklin,
and Grant counties, home to Hanford Reach NM established in 2000), and including 10
Oregon counties located along the Washington border. Descriptive statistics and income
time plots are reported in Table A.9 and Figure A.9.
Figure A.9: Time Path of Per Capita Income, Mount St. Helens NM, Washington
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Table A.9: County Characteristics, Mount St. Helens NM, Washington
Variable Source N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Per capita income ($2015) BEA 2070 30,142.97 8,580.23
Population density BEA 2070 118.94 258.81
% total income from farms BEA 2070 5.03 8.49
Annual growth, all employment BEA 2070 1.71 3.85
Annual growth, farm employment BEA 2070 0.42 7.48
Annual growth, private nonfarm BEA 2070 2.17 5.61
employment
Annual growth, government BEA 2070 1.37 3.47
employment
% farm employment BEA 2070 9.81 9.67
% private nonfarm employment BEA 2070 69.54 12.69
% government employment BEA 2070 20.65 8.82
Industrial mix employment growth BEA 405 1.05 0.05
(farm, private nonfarm, gov’t)
% population, female Census 225 50.02 0.97
% population, nonwhite Census 225 8.42 6.97
% population over age 15, married Census 225 60.68 6.76
% population, college graduate Census 225 16.10 7.45
% population over age 16, in Census 225 58.90 5.50
labor force
% population, living in poverty Census 225 13.15 3.83
Unemployment rate Census, 1260 7.66 2.66
BLS
Note: The data includes 3 treatment counties and 42 donor counties for 1970-2015. The set
of donor counties includes 32 counties in Washington, plus 10 border counties in Oregon.
The Washington counties excluded from the analysis were Adams, Benton, Franklin, and
Grant, home to Hanford Reach NM. Industrial mix employment growth is measured at five-
year intervals following Partridge et al. (2012). BEA data is from interactive data tables
(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017). Census data is from Minnesota Population Center
(2016). Unemployment data for 1970 and 1980 is from Census and for 1990-2015 is from
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017b).
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B Synthetic Control Weights of Donor Counties, by Host County
Table B.1: Carrizo Plain NM, California
San Luis Obispo
Donor Weight
Butte 0.765
Alpine 0.122
Marin 0.093
Nevada 0.018
Napa 0.002
Others 0.000
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Table B.2: Giant Sequoia NM, California
Fresno Kern Tulare
Donor Weight Donor Weight Donor Weight
Madera 0.292 San Bernardino 0.245 Madera 0.459
Butte 0.265 Kings 0.189 Imperial 0.269
Los Angeles 0.223 San Joaquin 0.171 Butte 0.167
Imperial 0.167 Imperial 0.156 Yuba 0.099
Humboldt 0.015 Madera 0.083 San Francisco 0.002
Yuba 0.006 Los Angeles 0.059 Others 0.002
Merced 0.005 Mono 0.049
Yolo 0.003 Humboldt 0.025
Others 0.023 San Benito 0.002
Others 0.018
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Table B.3: Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains NM, California
Riverside
Donor Weight
San Bernardino 0.353
Lake 0.257
Los Angeles 0.200
Placer 0.066
Madera 0.044
Nevada 0.010
Sacramento 0.009
Imperial 0.008
San Benito 0.005
Stanislaus 0.005
El Dorado 0.004
Sonoma 0.004
Alpine 0.003
Santa Cruz 0.002
Shasta 0.002
Sutter 0.002
Yolo 0.002
Others 0.030
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Table B.4: Canyon of the Ancients NM, Colorado
Dolores Montezuma
Donor Weight Donor Weight
Jackson 0.317 Lake 0.252
Kiowa 0.213 Fremont 0.117
Costilla 0.180 Conejos 0.095
Daggett (UT) 0.162 San Juan (NM) 0.094
Elbert 0.091 Gilpin 0.059
Bent 0.024 Taos (NM) 0.045
Conejos 0.004 Costilla 0.030
Sedgwick 0.001 Delta 0.029
Apache (AZ) 0.001 Moffat 0.027
Rio Arriba (NM) 0.001 Saguache 0.022
Others 0.000 Grand 0.008
Yuma 0.008
Uintah (UT) 0.008
Alamosa 0.007
Baca 0.007
Douglas 0.007
Garfield 0.007
Crowley 0.006
Phillips 0.006
Rio Blanco 0.006
Routt 0.006
Rio Arriba (NM) 0.006
Bent 0.005
Cheyenne 0.005
Elbert 0.005
Kiowa 0.005
Kit Carson 0.005
Las Animas 0.005
Lincoln 0.005
Mineral 0.005
Montrose 0.005
Teller 0.005
Others 0.099
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Table B.6: Cascade-Siskiyou NM, Oregon
Jackson
Donor Weight
Josephine 0.428
Lane 0.224
Yamhill 0.189
Washington 0.066
Clackamas 0.050
Benton 0.037
Others 0.004
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Table B.7: Newberry NM, Oregon
Deschutes
Donor Weight
Josephine 0.481
Washington 0.428
Jefferson 0.091
Others 0.000
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C Synthetic Control Results, by Host County
Figure C.1: Giant Sequoia NM, California
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(b) Kern county
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Figure C.2: Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains NM, California (Riverside
county)
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Figure C.3: Canyon of the Ancients NM, Colorado
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(a) Dolores county
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Figure C.4: Upper Missouri River Breaks NM, Montana
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(a) Blaine county
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(b) Chouteau county
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(c) Fergus county
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67
Figure C.5: Cascade-Siskiyou NM, Oregon (Jackson county)
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Figure C.6: Newberry NM, Oregon (Deschutes county)
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Figure C.7: Hanford Reach NM, Washington
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(a) Adams county
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(b) Benton county
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(c) Franklin county
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Figure C.8: Mount St. Helens, Washington
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(b) Lewis county
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D Additional Robustness Checks
Table D.1: RMSPE Tests (All Control Counties)
Post/Pre
Treatment Unit
Percentage
RMSPE Ratio
Rank / # of
All Units
Carrizo Plain, California
San Luis Obispo 1.92 31/53 58.49%
Max/Min (All Units) 12.51/0.72
Giant Sequoia, California
Fresno 3.53 19/52 36.54%
Kern 1.48 44/52 84.62%
Tulare 0.70 52/52 100%
Max/Min (All Units) 11.58/0.92
Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains, California
Riverside 3.05 20/49 40.82%
Max/Min (All Units) 10.81/0.72
Canyon of the Ancients, Colorado
Dolores 3.85 15/67 22.40%
Montezuma 1.24 59/67 88.10%
Max/Min (All Units) 22.73/0.60
Upper Missouri River Breaks, Montana
Blaine 5.01 9/52 17.30%
Chouteau 1.23 44/52 84.60%
Fergus 2.23 24/52 46.20%
Phillips 2.12 25/52 48.10%
Max/Min (All Units) 18.03/0.79
Cascade-Siskiyou, Oregon
Jackson 2.47 10/37 27.03%
Max/Min (All Units) 8.71/0.81
Newberry, Oregon
Deschutes 2.53 13/34 38.24%
Max/Min (All Units) 8.52/0.67
Hanford Reach, Washington
Adams 1.53 29/42 69.05%
Benton 1.73 26/42 61.90%
Franklin 3.13 6/42 14.28%
Grant 1.98 21/42 50.00%
Max/Min (All Units) 7.35/0.52
Mount St. Helens, Washington
Cowlitz 6.65 4/39 10.26%
Lewis 8.61 2/39 5.13%
Skamania 1.08 32/39 82.05%
Max/Min (All Units) 9.21/0.50
Note: Max/Min indicates the maximum/minimum post/pre RMSPE ratio from
placebo runs, including the RMSPE of the treatment unit. Percentage is a proxy
for p-value, which is obtained from the ratio of the treatment unit rank to the number
of all units (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). In the falsification analysis, the synthetic con-
trol method did not converge for the following counties: El Dorado (Carrizo Plain);
Trinity and Tuolomne (Giant Sequoia); Monterey, Napa, Santa Barbara, Trinity and
Yuba (Santa Rosa and San Jacinto Mountains); Mineral (Canyon of the Ancients);
Wibaux (Upper Missouri River Breaks); Gilliam (Cascade-Siskiyou); Harney (New-
berry); Garfield (Hanford Reach); and Clark, Columbia, Garfield, and Pierce (Mount
St. Helens).
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E Analysis of Mount St. Helens Eruption Effect
Figure E.1: Mount St. Helens Eruption Effect
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